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I. INTRODUCTION 
Romulo Castro considered attending his asylum interview in Rosedale, 
Queens, [New York] dressed as Fidela Castro, a towering drag queen in six-
inch stilettos, a bright green poodle skirt and a mane of strawberry blonde 
hair. In the end, Mr. Castro, 34, opted for what he described as 
understatement: pink eye shadow, a bright pink V-neck shirt and 
intermittent outbursts of tears. After years of trying to conceal his sexual 
orientation back home in Brazil (where Fidela never made an appearance), 
Mr. Castro had been advised by his immigration lawyer that flaunting it was 
now his best weapon against deportation.1 
Mr. Castro sought asylum as a refugee from Brazil because his home 
country’s attitudes toward, and treatment of, the LGBT community convinced 
him he could not live safely without concealing integral parts of his identity.2 
When the international community first defined a refugee in 1951 and 
established criteria for those who could seek asylum in a receiving country, 
rights for the LGBT community were probably not even considered at the time.3 
Convened at a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Geneva, the United Nations 
agreed to a treaty concerning refugees: the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.4 A refugee is defined as one who 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a PSG or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.5 
                                                        
 † JD, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden; LLM, Emory University School of Law; 
BA, Stetson University; currently practicing as an appellate attorney practicing in Florida. 
This article was written as part of a course on Sexuality and Gender offered at Emory 
University School of Law in Fall 2014 and presented at the 2015 Law and Society Annual 
Conference. Thanks to Professors Stu Marvel and Kate Aschenbrenner for their guidance, 
insights, and feedback on this article. 
 1. Dan Bilefsky, Gays Seeking Asylum in U.S. Encounter a New Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/nyregion/29asylum.html [hereinafter Gays 
Seeking Asylum]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. After all, the first time that countries on the international stage even discussed discrimination 
based on sexual orientation was in 2008. See REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2008), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-homosexuality-idUSTRE4BH7EW20081219. 
 4. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; G.A. Res. 
429 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775, at 48 (Dec. 14, 1950) 
[hereinafter 1951 Convention]. This covered only those persons who had become refugees as 
a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951. Id. In 1967, a Protocol was signed that 
expanded the definition to applicants who became a refugee after 1951. Article 1A(2) 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223 (1968) [hereinafter 1967 
Protocol]. 
 5. Article 1A(2), 1967 Protocol, supra note 4. While the United States was not a signatory to 
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Asylum applicants who qualify as refugees are protected from 
“refoulement,” which is the return of a person to a country where her life or 
freedom would be threatened.6 Sovereign states that are signatories to the 1951 
Refugee Convention,7 or the 1967 Protocol,8 withhold removal for those refugees 
in order to comport with the principle of non-refoulement and satisfy the nation’s 
obligations under those documents.9 This means that an applicant like Romulo 
Castro, who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution in his own 
country, should be able to apply for asylum based on sexual orientation and 
identity. Unfortunately, receiving countries’ attitudes and actions make such an 
application that much more daunting for LGBT applicants. 
 Although there is not one monolithic, linear development of a person’s 
sexual identity, the reality is that preconceived notions of what it is to “be gay” 
permeate the asylum process.10 The international LGBT11 community has 
                                                        
the initial Convention, it is a signatory to the Protocol which incorporates the original 
Convention. Id. Membership in a PSG or particular social group refers to persecution that is 
directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons, all of whom share a 
common, immutable characteristic that is beyond the power of the members of the group to 
change, or is so fundamental to their identities or consciences that it ought not to be required 
to be changed. Matter of Acosta, 19 I & N 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 6. 1951 Convention, supra note 4. 
 7. Id.  
 8. The 1967 Protocol extended coverage to all refugees regardless of when they had become 
refugees. 1967 Protocol, supra note 4. 
 9. See, e.g., Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
 10. See, e.g., STONEWALL—THE LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL CHARITY, IMMIGRATION & 
ASYLUM, http://www.stonewall.org.uk/what_we_do/research_and_policy/2874.asp. For 
more detailed information, see NATHANAEL MILES, NO GOING BACK: LESBIAN AND GAY 
PEOPLE AND THE ASYLUM SYSTEM (2010). 
 11. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Trans. Generally, these terms can be defined as follows:  
Lesbian is a term for a female whose primary sexual orientation is to other 
women. Gay is a term for a male whose primary sexual orientation is to other 
men. This term is sometimes used by lesbians (i.e., gay women). Bisexual is a 
term for a person whose sexual orientation is directed towards individuals of 
more than one sex or gender, though not necessarily at the same time. Trans is 
an umbrella term referring to people who do not embrace traditional binary 
gender norms of masculine and feminine and/or whose gender identity or 
expression does not fit with the one they were assigned at birth; it can refer to 
transgender, transitioned, transsexual, and genderqueer people, as well as some 
two-spirit people. Transgender is a term used by individuals who fall[] outside 
of traditional gender categories or norms. It literally means “across gender,” and 
conveys the idea of transcending the boundaries of the gender binary system. It 
however is not necessarily a desire to be of the “opposite” sex.  
  S. Marvel et al., Listening to LGBTQ People on Assisted Human Reproduction: Access to 
Reproductive Materials, Services and Facilities 1 n.2 (2015) (on file with author). This 
Article will refer to LGBT and is not intended to exclude any group within LGBT from its 
analysis. However, the reality is that most of the reported cases, particularly in the United 
States, involve lesbian and gay asylum applicants. Additionally, there is an added nuance 
related to some identities that deviates from some of the broader themes in this analysis. For 
example, transgender individuals are treated differently in Iran that LGB individuals, in that 
a fatwa has been issued to protect them and to accept transgender individuals. However, that 
country’s protection of transgender individuals has a darker side in that this protection is 
being used to resolve the problem of being gay in Iran and has caused many to flee that 
country and seek asylum based on the threat of sexual reassignment surgery. See Ali 
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identified the concept of discretion as an area of particular concern, at least for 
the United States and Australia.12 Discretion, understood broadly, is an 
assumption that if an LGBT applicant chooses to live discretely, or even 
completely closeted, he or she would not be subject to future persecution, even if 
the applicant’s home country has a pervasive homophobic culture or existing 
laws criminalizing homosexual behavior.13 A more pressing concern is how this 
behavioral discretion defines and shapes LGBT identity in a particular social 
group (PSG) in the asylum process. Both of these issues, behavioral discretion 
and identity, ultimately impact whether or not an individual’s claim of 
persecution will be deemed valid because behavioral discretion often supplants 
identity in an asylum determination. 
As the approach to LGBT asylum claims has evolved, receiving countries 
have grappled with the tension between discretion and identity, which is endemic 
within the asylum process.14 Recently, the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (CIS) has promulgated new guidelines for asylum officers 
processing LGBT asylum claims.15 These guidelines apply at the initial 
adjudicatory step of the asylum process, where the interviewers shape the 
contours of the applicant’s identity by the types of questions asked, the 
testimony received, and the facts found.16 The guidelines address many of the 
concerns voiced by the international LGBT community, and shared by many 
receiving countries, with respect to properly processing LGBT asylum claims 
and removing some of the Westernized stereotypes that act as improper barriers 
                                                        
Hamedani, The Gay People Pushed to Change Their Gender, BBC MAGAZINE (Nov. 5, 
2014), www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29832690; Lorah Moftah, Iran Transgender Law: 
Islamic Republic Advances Bill to Protect Transsexuals Amid Crackdown on Gay Rights, 
INT’L BUSINESS TIMES (May 27, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-transgender-law-
islamic-republic-advances-bill-protect-transsexuals-amid-1940978.  
 12. See generally Sabine Jansen, Introduction: Fleeing Homophobia, Asylum Claims Related to 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Europe, in FLEEING HOMOPHOBIA: SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY & ASYLUM 1–22 (Thomas Spijkerboer ed., 2013); Jenni 
Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the 
Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom, 13 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 391 
(2009) [hereinafter Discretion to Disbelief]. 
 13. See generally Janna Weβels, Discretion in Sexuality-Based Asylum Cases: An Adaptive 
Phenomenon, in FLEEING HOMOPHOBIA, supra note 12, at 55–77; see also Discretion to 
Disbelief, supra note 12. This concept of discretion is distinguished from the judicial 
discretion that is exercised by asylum adjudicators in the United States. When referencing 
discretion and identity in these applications, this Article focuses on the applicant’s behavior, 
or the court’s imposition of certain constructs upon the applicant’s identity based on 
behavior, not on the discretion that would be exercised in deciding whether to grant an 
application. See generally Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 1987); 8 C.F.R. § 
208.13 (2013). 
 14. See Weβels, supra note 13, at 55–56. 
 15. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR ADJUDICATING LESBIAN, GAY, 




March-2012.pdf [hereinafter U.S. CIS Guidelines]. 
 16. Id. 
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to asylum.17 At the same time, recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)18 
opinions have rearticulated the PSG requirement—replacing the term “social 
visibility” with “social distinction” in the hope of dispelling the notion that a 
group must be actually visible to be persecuted, which may also have a positive 
impact on LGBT claims.19 
While the guidelines represent a ground up20 approach that is laudable, 
particularly in the United States where identity is still subject to stereotypical 
Westernized notions of what it is to be gay, they are not binding at any level of 
the asylum process.21 The question remains whether the guidelines could be 
adjusted to more sufficiently address discretion and identity at every level of the 
asylum process so that there is consistent guidance that is both meaningful and 
effective. 
In Australia, asylum applicants have faced a different struggle with respect 
to discretion. Instead of being a barrier to an establishment of identity, the 
struggle has been in terms of finding a well-founded fear of persecution.22 
Looking at the ongoing difficulties Australia has faced in combating the 
lingering power of behavioral discretion in the adjudicatory process is instructive 
in considering what may come next for the United States. While the High Court 
in Australia has made it clear that discretion is not to be considered when 
determining if an applicant may avoid persecution upon returning home, there 
are concerns that discretion persists in the decision-making process with respect 
to discrediting identity claims.23 In addition, the Supreme Court of the United 
                                                        
 17. Id. For a discussion of Westernized notions of gay identity, see infra Part III. 
 18. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is the highest ranking administrative body in the 
United States CIS. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm. The BIA acts as an appellate body, as it conducts 
only paper review of decisions, and its decisions are controlling on Department of Homeland 
Security officials and Immigration Judges unless those decisions are overruled by the 
Attorney General or the federal courts. Id. 
 19. See Matter of M-E-V-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014) (renaming the “social visibility” 
component of the PSG requirement of “social distinction” such that a PSG designation 
requires that the group be socially distinct within the society in question as perceived by that 
society, not the persecutor).  
 20. See Jenni Millbank, Sexual Orientation and Refugee Status Determination Over the Past 20 
Years: Unsteady Progress Through Standard Sequences?, in FLEEING HOMOPHOBIA, supra 
note 12, at 35–36. Millbank discusses the problems caused by the lack of public access to 
written reasons for lower level, threshold decisions, and the biases that continue to recur 
through backsliding. Id. 
 21. See U.S. CIS GUIDELINES, supra note 15. 
 22. See Appellant S395/2002 and S396/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs (2003) 216 C.L.R. 473 (Austl.). 
 23. See Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 12; Jenni Millbank, The Right of Lesbians and Gay 
Men to Live Freely, Openly, and on Equal Terms Is Not Bad Law: A Reply to Hathaway and 
Pobjoy, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 497, 504 (2012) [hereinafter Reply to Hathaway and 
Pobjoy] (noting the invidious nature of discretion and its tendency to adopt the view of the 
persecutor rather than the persecuted); James C. Hathaway & Jason Pobjoy, Queer Cases 
Make Bad Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 315, 332 (2012) [hereinafter Queer Cases]; see 
generally Christopher N. Kendall, Lesbian and Gay Refugees in Australia: Now that ‘Acting 
Discreetly’ Is No Longer an Option, Will Equality Be Forthcoming?, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
715 (2003). 
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Kingdom handed down a retooled formulation of discretion, which once again 
created subcategories of applicants and suggested discretion is an appropriate 
consideration so long as it is not exercised out of a fear of persecution.24 This 
discussion will focus on a comparison of the evolution of LGBT asylum claims 
in Australia and the United States. In addition, at least one recent decision from 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom will be included as a high-level 
judgment from a similarly-situated common law receiving country, which is 
crucial for a deeper understanding of the nuances of discretion, particularly as 
applied in Australia.25 
Part II of this paper will examine and compare how the LGBT asylum 
process has evolved—specifically vis-à-vis identity and discretion—in the 
United States and Australia, which can help highlight some of the issues driven 
by improper application of Western essentialist LGBT definitions on asylum 
claims. Part II will also analyze the concepts of refugee and asylum law 
internationally, as well as the concerns of the gay international community with 
respect to asylum law globally. Parts III and IV will review the asylum process 
for LGBT asylum applicants in the United States and Australia, respectively—
with a focus on identity, discretion, and persecution. Part V discusses the 
intersection of discretion and identity and what can be done to more 
appropriately address asylum claims based on sexual identity or orientation 
against a backdrop of prevalent anti-immigration sentiments in both countries. 
Finally, Parts V and VI will make suggestions for moving forward in making the 
asylum process in both countries more equitable for LGBT asylum applicants. 
II. REFUGEE LAW AND THE GAY INTERNATIONAL 
A. Human Rights and Refugee Rights for LGBT Individuals 
Refugee rights have not developed in a vacuum. Instead they have evolved 
based on universally defined human rights.26 One of the most basic precepts of 
                                                        
 24. See HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), (2010) UKSC 31, (2011) 1 
A.C. 596, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c3456752.html; see also Jansen, supra note 12; 
Queer Cases, supra note 23, at 335. HJ also has a different problem in that it may extend 
protection to activities that should not be subject to protection such as going to concerts, 
drinking cocktails and “boy talk” with female friends, because these are relatively trivial 
activities from a human rights perspective. Queer Cases, supra note 23, at 335. Thus, HJ is 
both under- and over- inclusive. Id. While Hathaway and Pobjoy make an interesting point, it 
feels more like an artificial one. See generally Reply to Hathaway and Pobjoy, supra note 23. 
What the court was trying to say was that the right to live openly in a society should be 
protected and to the extent an applicant chooses not to live openly out of fear of being 
persecuted, such an applicant may be entitled to protection under the 1951 Convention. See 
id. at 510–11. However, they correctly observe that the court missed the tension between 
protections of activities associated with sexual orientation versus protection of identity itself. 
See id. This is one of the inherent problems with the construction of protection for sexual 
orientation and identity in the first place. See id. 
 25. See generally Reply to Hathaway and Pobjoy, supra note 23. 
 26. See, e.g., U.N. G.A. Res. 3/217A(III), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948), http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html [hereinafter 
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human rights is that human beings should enjoy fundamental rights and 
freedoms without discrimination.27 Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights provides that, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”28  
 Sexual orientation as a protected status finds support in the specific non-
discrimination provisions on account of “sex” or “other status” in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights29 (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights30 (ICESC), “as 
well as in Article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child[31] . . . as 
affirmed by the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.”32 However, 
even though LGBT persons are entitled to human rights, just as any other global 
citizen, freedom of sexual orientation is not explicitly recognized as a human 
right.33 Building on these rights for the LGBT community, the Yogyakarta 
                                                        
UDHR]. 
 27. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4. 
 28. UDHR, supra note 26. 
 29. UN G.A., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html. 
 30. UN G.A., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html. 
 31. UN G.A., Convention on the Rights of the Child (Sept. 2, 1990), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38f0.html. 
 32. See UNHCR GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS RELATING TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
AND GENDER IDENTITY, UNHCR, 6 n.12 (Nov. 21, 2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/resources/UNHCR_Guidelines_Sexual_Orientati
on.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR GUIDELINES 2008] (“Sexual orientation is a fundamental part of 
human identity, as are those five characteristics of human identity that form the basis of the 
refugee definition: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group and 
political opinion. Claims relating to sexual orientation and gender identity are primarily 
recognized under the 1951 Convention ground of membership of a particular social group, 
but may also be linked to other grounds, notably political opinion and religion, depending on 
the circumstances.”); see also Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. GAOR Hum. 
Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (finding that the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation). The UNHCR Guidelines 2008 note that this has subsequently been 
affirmed by several other UN human rights treaty bodies, including recognition that gender 
identity is among the prohibited grounds of discrimination. UNHCR Guidelines 2008, supra 
note 32, at 6 (citing UN Human Rights Council, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON DISCRIMINATORY LAWS AND PRACTICES AND 
ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS BASED ON THEIR SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ef092022.html). 
 33. UNHCR Guidelines 2008, supra note 32, at 6. To some extent, this statement may be 
misleading. If LGBT individuals are entitled to human rights, then how can their sexual 
orientation, part of their identity, not be protected as a human right already? As with many 
other human rights issues, anything that deviates from a very narrowly drawn narrative of 
what it means to be human and to have rights needs to be identified and specifically 
protected. The Yogyakarta Principles and the Resolutions passed by the United Nations are 
seemingly substantive steps in recognizing freedom of sexual orientation as a human right, 
even though intuitively we should understand it that way already. See THE INT’L COMM’N OF 
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Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity34 were drafted in 2006 to confirm States’ 
obligation to recognize that sexual orientation and gender identity are entitled to 
human rights protection.35 Then, in 2011, the United Nations passed a Resolution 
on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity that affirmed the 
“recognition that LGBT persons are endowed with the same inalienable rights—
and entitled to the same protections—as all human beings.”36 
B. Problems Inherent in the Asylum Process for LGBT Applicants 
LGBT applicants in asylum are both visible and vulnerable in a way that is 
somewhat unique.37 While LGBT applicants may have patent physical or visible 
qualities related to race or ethnicity, they also possess latent qualities, like 
religious belief and political opinion, which exist with respect to how their 
identity is embodied rather than expressed.38 This intersection of seen and 
unseen means that LGBT applicants are particularly susceptible to asylum 
processes that require them to somehow prove they are sufficiently LGBT to be 
entitled to protection despite the fact that much of their status is based on self-
identification and may be significantly affected by the persecution in their home 
                                                        
JURISTS & THE INT’L SERV. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES ON THE 
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY (2007), 
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf [hereinafter YOGYAKARTA 
PRINCIPLES]. The intersection of politics, culture, and policy all play a role in how this 
discussion of LGBT human rights has evolved, and there is always the struggle of whether 
focusing on a perceived difference to obtain greater legal protection is the best course of 
action as opposed to simply asserting LGBT rights as part of human rights writ large. 
 34. YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, supra note 33. The Principles were unanimously adopted in 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on November 6–9, 2006. Id. 
 35. See id.; see also M. O’Flaherty & J. Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and 
International Human Rights Law: Contextualizing the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 207 (2008). 
 36. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the UN 
Human Rights Council Resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender 
Identity (June 17, 2011). 
 37. As the Constitutional Court in South Africa observed in a landmark case: 
In the case of gays, history and experience teach us that the scarring comes not 
from poverty or powerlessness, but from invisibility. It is the tainting of desire, 
it is the attribution of perversity and shame to spontaneous bodily affection, it is 
the prohibition of the expression of love, it is the denial of full moral citizenship 
in society because you are what you are, and that impinges on the dignity and 
self-worth of a group. 
  Nat’l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. 
Afr.), at ¶127; see also Refugee Appeal No. 74665, New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority (July 7, 2004), http://www.refworld.org/docid/42234ca54.html. 
 38. See Nat’l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1 SA at ¶128 (“[T]heir identifying 
characteristic combines all the anxieties produced by sexuality with all the alienating effects 
resulting from difference; and they are seen as especially contagious or prone to corrupting 
others. None of these factors applies to other groups traditionally subject to discrimination, 
such as people of colour or women, each of whom, of course, have had to suffer their own 
specific forms of oppression.”). 
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country from which they have fled. 
Sexual orientation and gender identity are not explicitly identified 
categories within the definition of refugee for purposes of international law, 
which means that LGBT asylum applicants are required to demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution based on membership in a PSG.39 While receiving 
countries have had less difficulty recognizing that LGBT refugees may exist in 
PSGs, the more intractable problem has been determining whether they are 
situated within those PSGs as part of the identity requirement.40 Further 
exacerbating this problem is that even when identity and PSG are satisfied, it is 
often difficult for an applicant to establish a well-founded fear of persecution 
when a discretion requirement is improperly imposed upon the applicant or 
imputed to the objective part of that test.41 What follows is a short discussion of 
some, but not all, of the concerns that have been raised with respect to the 
processing of LGBT asylum claims. 
1. Identity 
Establishing an asylum applicant’s identity as a person with a protected 
status or as a member of a PSG is the first critical component in determining 
whether the applicant can satisfy the definition of refugee.42 While this is the 
same for any asylum applicant, in that he or she must always establish 
membership in a protected category or in a PSG, it can be difficult to establish in 
LGBT claims.43 The problem stems as much from the societal orientation of the 
initial asylum adjudicator in the receiving country as it does from the way 
identity is structured both in the receiving country and in the applicant’s home 
country.44 The “power dynamics of refugee determination procedures dictate that 
the construction of the applicant’s life story cannot challenge foundational tenets 
of the decision-maker’s understanding of the world.”45 Thus, the adjudicator’s 
understanding of what it means to be gay in his community can eclipse the 
                                                        
 39. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4; UNHCR Guidelines 2008, supra note 32; see also 
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990) (cited as precedent for all cases 
related to LGBT asylum applications and via membership in a PSG for the United States); 
European Union, Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for 
the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or 
as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection 
Granted, Art. 10(1)(d) (May 19, 2004), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4157e75e4.html. 
 40. See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 41. See, e.g., HJ and HT, [2010] UKSC, at 16–18 (Lord Hope lays out what he deems to be the 
proper test, bifurcating the discretion analysis, and referencing the later opinions of Lord 
Walker and Lord Rodger as stated in paragraphs 98 and 82 of their opinions, respectively).  
 42. See Laurie Berg & Jenni Millbank, Constructing the Personal Narratives of Lesbian, Gay 
and Bisexual Asylum Claimants, 22 J. REFUGEE STUD. 195, 196 (2009) [hereinafter Personal 
Narratives of LGBT]. 
 43. Id. at 196. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 197. 
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applicant’s own experience in a profound way. 
 An asylum interview can easily become a humiliating and tortuous process 
whereby the applicant must prove she is “gay” enough or the “right kind” of 
LGBT applicant because the applicant “is mo[re] likely to be seen when she . . . 
looks like what is being looked for.”46 This can be difficult if the applicant does 
not track the appropriate gay narrative when answering interview questions that 
are xenophobic or homophobic, including probing questions about sexual 
practices.47 Even more disheartening, until fairly recently, phallometry48 was 
practiced in some receiving countries, and although it appears to have abated, the 
lingering stigma within an environment that encouraged such a practice 
remains.49 
The Western gay narrative is one of initial discovery, recognition of self, 
and “coming out” to friends and family.50 The story then goes that the newly 
declared gay person who has publicly claimed a sexual preference behaves in a 
way that tracks with what society perceives as gay behavior—dressing a certain 
way, speaking a certain way, displaying certain mannerisms, and preferring 
certain hobbies and behaviors.51 The use of a Westernized definition of what it 
                                                        
 46. Personal Narratives of LGBT, supra note 40 at 197; see also Gays Seeking Asylum, supra 
note 1. 
 47. See, e.g., Gay Asylum Seekers Face “Humiliation,” THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/08/gay-asylum-seekers-humiliation-home-
office; Sally Hayden, The UK Wants to Deport a Ugandan Woman Who Fled Her Country 
After an Exorcism, VICE NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/the-uk-wants-
to-deport-a-ugandan-woman-who-fled-her-country-after-an-exorcism. 
 48. The procedure involves placing a pressure-sensitive device around a man’s penis, presenting 
him with an array of sexually stimulating images, and determining his level of sexual 
attraction by measuring minute changes in his erectile responses. Jason R. Odeshoo, Of 
Penology and Perversity: The Use of Penile Plethysmography on Convicted Child Sex 
Offenders, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). A similar technique is also 
apparently available for women. Id.  
 49. See Jansen, supra note 12. 
 50. Marni A. Brown, Coming Out Narratives: Realities of Intersectionality (Dec. 16, 2011) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University), 
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/sociology_diss/63; Susanna Walters, The Problem with 
“Coming Out,” NORTHEASTERN UNIV. NEWS (July 13, 2014), 
http://www.northeastern.edu/cssh/news/the-problem-with-coming-out-the-flawed-cultural-
expectations-of-gay-life-in-america (“While it is true that there are eight million (and 
counting) stories in the naked city, the coming-out story has long been offered as the master 
narrative of gay life. Indeed, the phrase “coming out” has so permeated cultural 
understanding that it has even moved from being a story gay people tell about themselves to 
others to a story multiplied through relationships (for example, when someone “comes out” 
as having a lesbian daughter or being the child of a gay man).”) (citing SUSANNA WALTERS, 
THE TOLERANCE TRAP: HOW GOD, GENES, AND GOOD INTENTIONS ARE SABOTAGING GAY 
EQUALITY). 
 51. This narrative is generally reflected in societal attitudes and in the media itself. See, e.g., 
Maya Dusenbery, What About the Guys Who Do Fit the “Gay Stereotype”?, THE ATLANTIC 
(May 31, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/05/what-about-the-guys-
who-do-fit-the-gay-stereotype/276407/. For example, consider Romulo Castro’s story. See 
Gays Seeking Asylum, supra note 1. In order to convey his identity, he need to tie it to a 
narrative that resonated with his Western audience, even if it did not reflect his day-to-day 
existence. See id. It was a necessary evil to receive protection from actual persecution. Id. 
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means to be LGBT can be dangerous when dealing with asylum applicants.52 It 
allows for a stereotypical picture to emerge that may harm an LGBT applicant 
who has been forced to act with discretion in order to survive in a non-Western 
country. For example, “LGBT persons may be . . . forced into arranged 
marriages or experience extreme pressure to marry. They might fear that a failure 
to marry will ultimately mark them out as LGBT in the public eye.”53 Thus, an 
LGBT person may marry to avoid harm in their home country, and then that 
coercive act may be used to discount the LGBT applicant’s claim of identity 
because, according to the typical Western narrative, gay people do not marry 
straight people.54 More subtle, of course, is the Western notion of coming out 
and an applicant’s failure to do so to friends and family in their home country 
may be considered a sign that the applicant is not really gay.55 
Other than the obviously intrusive nature of asking detailed questions about 
one’s sex life, the underlying reasons for one’s attraction to a particular sex, or a 
failure to properly assert one’s LGBT identity, the problem is that how an 
individual defines himself becomes less important than how that person’s 
identity fits within the receiving country’s perception of what it means to be 
LGBT.56 Another problem is that LGBT asylum applicants face not only the 
psychological problems attendant to any applicant’s claim, but also additional 
impediments like depression, shame, and violence.57 Berg and Millbank identify 
significant psychological features in an LGBT claim as: “a reluctance to reveal 
group membership as the basis of a claim, the experience of passing or 
concealment strategies, the impact of shame and depression on memory, 
common experience of sexual assault, and sexualization of the identity narrative 
in the legal process.”58 Just as with other types of abuse and psychological 
trauma, these more distinct psychological features can prevent proper 
consideration of an asylum application because the applicant is unable to fully 
                                                        
 52. It can, for that matter, be problematic for any LGBT individual. See Preston Mitchum, On 
National Coming Out Day, Don’t Disparage the Closet, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/10/on-national-coming-out-day-dont-
disparage-the-closet/280469/. 
 53. UNHCR Guidelines 2008, supra note 32, at 8. Note that these behaviors were not so unusual 
in the United States even one generation ago—we simply have a short memory as a society. 
See, e.g., Cheri Lawson, A Place for Straight Spouses After Their Mate Comes Out of the 
Closet, NPR (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/09/16/440909117/a-place-for-
straight-spouses-after-their-mate-comes-out-of-the-closet. 
 54. Of course, another problem may be that bisexual people may marry straight people, making 
them even more vulnerable to the Western gay narrative. 
 55. See, e.g., Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2009); Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 
1027 (8th Cir. 2007); Gays Seeking Asylum, supra note 1. 
 56. See Gays Seeking Asylum, supra note 1. 
 57. Personal Narratives of LGBT, supra note 42, at 198.  
 58. Id. This is not to suggest that there is one universal LGBT experience; in fact, quite the 
opposite. While there may be similar experiences, features and contours, every experience 
will be shaped significantly by the context (time, place, and manner) within which the 
experience occurs. However, the unifying experiences, particularly those that relate to 
asylum applications premised on persecution, are more closely aligned.  
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convey the lived experience within the native country; to the extent that these 
traumas are further minimized due to a pervasive narrative about what it means 
to be LGBT, they can compound and exacerbate what can already feel like an 
insurmountable obstacle for an LGBT applicant. 
2. Discretion 
“Discretion” —or the notion that an applicant can live covertly and escape 
persecution—impacts the applicant’s ability to demonstrate a well-founded fear 
of persecution.59 “‘Discreet’ suggests that the individual will be expected to be 
‘considerate,’ ‘judicious,’ ‘prudent,’ ‘circumspect,’ ‘well-behaved,’ ‘civil’ and 
‘polite’ and not ‘indiscreet,’ meaning ‘injudicious,’ ‘imprudent,’ ‘inconsiderate,’ 
‘unadvised,’ and ‘unwary.’”60 However, what discretion really expects is that an 
individual will conceal their identity and deny who they are to avoid a 
persecutive environment.61 “LGBT persons who live in fear of being publicly 
identified will often conceal their sexual orientation as a result in order to avoid 
the severe consequences of such exposure, including the risk of incurring harsh 
criminal penalties, arbitrary house raids, dismissal from employment and societal 
disapproval.”62 Individuals may choose to live this way or not, but an LGBT 
individual’s choice to live with discretion, for whatever reason, does not mean 
that it is appropriate to consider that individual’s ability to be discrete in 
determining whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution. 
Discretion improperly focuses the question of safety upon return on the 
applicant’s behavior instead of the applicant’s identity. It either does so directly, 
by imposing a responsibility on the applicant to act discretely to avoid 
persecution, or indirectly, by finding that the way the applicant acts will not 
encourage persecution if he returns and continues acting in that way.63 Relying 
on discretion as a reason to find there is no well-founded fear of persecution 
neglects two important truths: 1) if an applicant needs to live discretely to avoid 
persecution, it would appear to reflect the notion that a persecutive environment 
exists; and 2) even if an applicant does live discretely for personal reasons, it 
does not mean other actors will honor this choice, and they can expose the 
applicant to persecution.64 
                                                        
 59. See Jansen, supra note 12; Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 12, at 393 (“At its baldest, 
discretion reasoning entail[s] a reasonable expectation that persons should, to the extent that 
it is possible, cooperate in their own protection, by exercising self-restraint such as avoiding 
any behaviour that would identify them as gay; never telling anyone they were gay; only 
expressing their sexuality by having anonymous sex in public places; pretending that their 
partner is a flatmate; or indeed remaining celibate.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 60. Weβels, supra note 13, at 64–65 (quoting the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s 
brief before the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in HJ and HT at 29). 
 61. See id. 
 62. UNHCR Guidelines 2008, supra note 32, at 8. 
 63. See, e.g., S395/2002, [2003] HCA 71, 216 CLR 473; Todorovic v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 621 F.3d 
1318 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 64. See Queer Cases, supra note 23, at 346; Todorovic, 621 F.3d at 1326–27. 
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Discretion even asserts itself within the initial determination of an 
applicant’s claim of identity within a PSG. If the applicant has been living 
discretely, or even completely hiding his or her orientation in the applicant’s 
home country, it will make establishing identity in a PSG that much more 
difficult.65 Given the inherent biases that may already be present in an initial 
interview with respect to matching the anticipated stereotype of an LGBT 
asylum seeker or looking like what the interviewer is looking for, it can make an 
asylum claim nearly impossible to prove.66 
3. Particular Social Group 
Generally, most receiving nations, including the member states of the 
European Union and the Commonwealth, acknowledge sexual orientation as a 
PSG.67 The problem with PSG is not that it fails to receive recognition as such, 
but rather that receiving countries like the United Kingdom have created sub-
classes of LGBT applicants based upon whether the applicant lives openly as an 
LGBT person, or whether the applicant has lived discretely or has otherwise 
completely hidden that person’s identity in their home country.68 Whereas an 
LGBT person who by their very nature simply chooses not to wear their sexual 
identity on their sleeve or to otherwise live openly may be denied protection, an 
applicant who satisfies the proper notion of living openly gay may receive 
protection even though each person is subject to, and at risk of, persecution. 
And, in some sense, as discretion has become less of a marker of persecution, it 
has evolved from being a distinction between open versus closeted to a more 
pervasive assessment of gender-conforming versus queer. 
C. No Single Essential LGBT Experience 
Part of the problem inherent in determining LGBT asylum claims is the 
tendency in receiving countries to reference a distinctly Westernized, essentialist 
narrative of what it means to be LGBT. This is due in large part to so-called 
                                                        
 65. See Gays Seeking Asylum, supra note 1.  
 66. See, e.g., Todorovic, 621 F.3d at 1318. 
 67. UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), SUMMARY REPORT, INFORMAL 
MEETING OF EXPERTS ON REFUGEE CLAIMS RELATING TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fa910f92.html; 
Millbank, supra note 12, at 36 n.6 (citing Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights (2011)); HJ and HT, (2010) UKSC, at 5 (Lord Hope) (“There is no doubt that gay 
men and women may be considered to be a PSG . . . regulation 6(1)(e) of the Refugee or 
Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/2525) 
recognises as clearly as can be that a group based on a common characteristic of sexual 
orientation may be included in a PSG that is in need of international protection.”); Refugee 
Appeal No. 1312/93 Re GJ (Aug. 30, 1995); (1998) INLR 387, a decision cited with 
approval by Lord Steyn in R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shah (1999) 2 AC 
629 at 643D & 644G (HL) (“New Zealand”); Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 
819. 
 68. HJ and HT, 2010 UKSC at 16–18 (Lord Hope); see also Appellant S395, 216 CLR at 473 
(rejecting the sub-division of homosexual men in a PSG into discrete and non-discrete). 
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political geography. Hathaway and Pobjoy explain that “[w]hile not so long ago 
institutionalized homophobia was common in developed countries, most of the 
North has now moved to embrace gay rights.”69 But the authors caution: 
The same evolution has not taken place in the political South, [thus it is not 
surprising] that members of sexual minorities in flight from both police and 
other state agents, as well as from vigilante and other private actors taking 
their cue from legislated homophobia, have increasingly sought the 
protection of Northern states that take a more sympathetic view of gay 
rights.70 
Because the majority of receiving countries are members of the political 
North, their distinctly Western narrative of LBGT identity will likely dominate 
the asylum discourse to the exclusion of other narratives. The Western narrative 
of what it means to be gay, and the acceptance of gay rights within that narrative, 
will further contribute to what is already an essentialist view of LGBT asylum 
seekers from the political South.71 
For example, in the United States, a person is more likely to be identified 
as gay if they have the appropriate coming out story, have some sort of physical 
manifestation of their queerness, have had same-sex partners, or have otherwise 
engaged in the quintessential gay experience such as pride parades and gay 
marriage.72 There is also an expectation that the coming out process is 
progressive and linear in nature, rather than a fluid and evolving identity of self 
and sexuality.73 Of course, as Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank have 
suggested, “the question of being ‘out’ is never answered once and for all, it is a 
decision made over and over, each day and in each new social situation. . . . The 
state of ‘closeted-ness’ is always a potentially permeable one.”74 And, it is 
always one that will be driven by the culture in which it is experienced, which is 
inherently more difficult where the culture does not recognize anything other 
                                                        
 69. Queer Cases, supra note 23, at 316–17. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id.; Sarah Hinger, Finding the Fundamental: Shaping Identity and Gender and Sexual 
Orientation Based on Asylum Claims, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 367, 389–90 (2010) 
(“Sexual orientation, like gender identity, is created by and through culture, as opposed to 
having an essential core . . . [and r]elying on an unstated presumption of what it means to be 
gay effectively denies cultural differences.”); Zsolt Bobis, You Are Not What You Ought to 
Be: Credibility Assessment in Sexuality-Based Asylum Cases 2–3 (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/bobis_zsolt.pdf.  
 72. See, e.g., Todorovic, 621 F.3d at 1326–27; Razkane, 526 F.3d at 1286. The concept of 
“coming out” is so entrenched that it even has its own Wikipedia page. See Coming Out, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coming_out (last visited July 9, 2016). 
 73. See Martin Manalansan, In the Shadows of Stonewall: Examining Gay Transnational Politics 
and the Diasporic Dilemma, 2 GLQ: A J. LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES 425, 434–35 (1995); 
Tim Teeman, Tim Cook: Why “I’m Gay” Isn’t Enough, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/30/tim-cook-why-i-m-gay-isn-t-enough.html. 
 74. Queer Cases, supra note 23, at 326 (quoting Catherine Dauvergne & Jenni Millbank, Before 
the High Court: Applicants S396/2002 and S395/2002, a Gay Refugee Couple from 
Bangladesh, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 97, 122 (2003)). 
KOLINSKY_FINAL WORD DOC 7.23.16 (DO  NOT DELETE) 7/23/2016  3:16 PM 
220 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & JUSTICE 
than a heteronormative identity.75 
The UNCHR Guidelines warn against the use of stereotypical images of 
LGBT persons, but it still happens.76 Certain lines of questioning are still used to 
test an applicant’s “queerness” such as the location of gay venues in both the 
home and receiving countries, LGBT organizations in the home country, or 
Westernized cultural icons in the LGBT community such as Madonna or Oscar 
Wilde.77 When these concerns are superimposed on the asylum process of a 
receiving country, the damage they can wreak becomes all the more apparent. 
 
III. LGBT ASYLUM CLAIMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Asylum Process 
In order to receive asylum under the Refugee Act of 1980,78 an applicant 
must demonstrate that: 
(1) [he or she has] a “fear” of “persecution”; (2) the fear must be “well-
founded”; (3) the persecution feared must be “on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a PSG, or political opinion”; and (4) [he or she] 
must be unable or unwilling to return to his country of nationality or to the 
country in which he last habitually resided because of persecution or his 
well-founded fear of persecution.79 
In order to qualify for asylum, an applicant must have been targeted on a 
protected basis.80 General country conditions such as natural and economic 
disasters, civil strife, or war are not cognizable bases for asylum claims.81 
                                                        
 75. Hinger, supra note 71; Bobis, supra note 71, at 28. As Bobis explains, “when the notion of 
homosexuality is not recognized in a society, an individual cannot identify as LGBT in that 
society. Therefore, when the Iranian President . . . asserts that in his country they ‘don’t have 
homosexuals’ what he claims is that ‘LGBT identity does not exist in Iran.’” Bobis, supra 
note 71, at 28. 
 76. UNHCR Guidelines 2008, supra note 32, at 16; Gay Asylum Seekers Face “Humiliation,” 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/08/gay-
asylum-seekers-humiliation-home-office; Sally Hayden, The UK Wants to Deport a 
Ugandan Woman Who Fled Her Country After an Exorcism, VICE NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014), 
https://news.vice.com/article/the-uk-wants-to-deport-a-ugandan-woman-who-fled-her-
country-after-an-exorcism. 
 77. See Bobis, supra note 71. 
 78. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.  
 79. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 219 (B.I.A. 1985). Any person who is physically 
present in the United States may apply for asylum as set forth in 8 U.S.C. §1158 (2014). 
 80. Matter of M-E-V-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 235. 
 81. Id. (citing Al Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 740 (3d Cir. 2005)) (“Generally, harsh 
conditions shared by many other persons do not amount to persecution. . . . [H]arm resulting 
from country-wide civil strife is not persecution ‘on account of’ an enumerated statutory 
factor.”); Matter of N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 323, 326 (B.I.A. 1998) (finding that an 
applicant who faced “a variety of dangers arising from the internal strife in Afghanistan” did 
not qualify for asylum). Instead, with respect to natural disasters, civil strife, or war, 
temporary protected status is the appropriate vehicle to seek relocation. See U.S. Citizen & 
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An asylum applicant in the United States must either file a claim 
affirmatively within a year of arrival, or the applicant may file a claim 
defensively in response to a deportation or removal action.82 If the application is 
an affirmative one, then it is first heard by an asylum officer with the U.S. 
Citizens and Immigration Services (U.S. CIS). If the application is a defensive 
one, then the claim is first heard by an immigration judge (IJ).83 Regardless of 
which adjudicator first hears an asylum application, that party is tasked with the 
responsibility of determining the applicant’s credibility.84 To that extent, those 
who have first contact with LGBT asylum seekers within the system wield a 
significant amount of power in determining whether an applicant’s sexual 
orientation satisfies the asylum requirements.85 
Depending on the applicant’s status, an asylum application heard by an 
interviewer and denied may go to an immigration judge (IJ), or if the initial 
decision is made by an IJ, to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).86 An 
applicant may then appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeal in the appropriate 
jurisdiction if necessary.87 Only decisions by the BIA and the Circuit Courts of 
Appeal are publicly reported.88 
B. PSGs, Identity, and Discretion 
1. Recognizing PSG Status 
The United States first recognized that a person could be a refugee based 
on his status as a homosexual in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso89 in 1990. The 
                                                        
Immigration Services, Temporary Protected Status, 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforced-
departure/temporary-protected-status; Matter of Sosa Ventura, 25 I. & N. Dec. 391, 394 
(B.I.A. 2010). 
 82. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii) (2005). A defensive claim also has a one 
year limit. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii) (2005). 
 83. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (2011). Although there are exceptions, as in the case of unaccompanied 
minors. 
 84. The IJ alone is positioned to make determinations about demeanor—by observing the 
applicant and assessing his or her tone and appearance—and in that sense is “uniquely 
qualified to decide whether an alien’s testimony has about it the ring of truth.” Todorovic, 
621 F.3d at 1324–25 (quoting Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 85. Although an appeal to the IJ from a decision of an asylum officer is entitled to de novo 
review, it is my understanding that parties have significant power in terms of assessing 
credibility and developing a factual basis for the claim. See Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr., 
Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, 
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Asylum%20Flow%20Char
t.pdf. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990). In that case, the applicant came to the United States as 
part of the Mariel Boat Lift after enduring years as a “registered” homosexual in Cuba and 
persistent detention by the police as well as a threat to leave the country or serve four years 
in prison. Id. 
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applicant, who was officially identified as a homosexual by the Cuban 
government, established his membership in a PSG in Cuba based on that status.90 
In 1994, the Attorney General declared the decision in Toboso-Alfonso to be 
“precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues,” thus finding 
sexual orientation to be an acceptable basis for a PSG.91 Since that time, it has 
been clearly established that LGBT applicants are a PSG and homosexuality is a 
protected identity.92 
The United States, while progressive in terms of recognizing LGBT 
entitlement to PSG status, has had a more troubling experience in defining 
membership within a PSG. What has come to the fore is that, in many cases, 
identity has been improperly considered in a way that permits discretion to 
function as a barrier to inclusion in a PSG and has permitted essentialist and 
stereotypical Western views of what it means to be gay to become part of the 
process. 
2. Identities and Discretion 
In Toboso-Alfonso, the applicant claimed to be homosexual, he was 
publicly identified within Cuba as a homosexual, and he was persecuted 
specifically because of that identified status.93 In that sense, his self-
identification matched with the PSG within which he was situated, and was 
“verified” by the government’s identification of Toboso-Alfonso as a 
homosexual.  
 However, in Razkane v. Holder94 in 2009, the applicant testified that he 
avoided dating, did not disclose his sexual orientation to his family or friends, 
and maintained minimal contacts with gay men to protect himself.95 Morocco, 
his country of origin, criminalized homosexual conduct; Islam, which he claimed 
was intolerant of homosexuality, was the dominant religion; and there was 
evidence that the police harassed and harmed homosexuals.96 Based on the 
evidence, the IJ found that Razkane could not be a member of the homosexual 
men in Morocco PSG because he did not appear gay nor did he have 
relationships that would identify him as gay.97 The IJ specifically found that 
Razkane’s “appearance d[id] not have anything about it that would designate 
[him] as being gay. [He did] not dress in an effeminate manner or affect any 
                                                        
 90. Id. 
 91. See ATTY. GEN. JANET RENO, MEMORANDUM FOR MARY MAGUIRE DUNNE, ACTING 
CHAIR, BD. OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS (June 16, 1994). 
 92. See, e.g., Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871 
(9th Cir. 2013). Arguably, this would include trans and queer individuals as well, although 
again, the Westernized notion of gender and sexual identity may create problems in cases 
such as these. 
 93. 20 I. & N. at 820–21.  
 94. 562 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 95. Id. at 1284. 
 96. Id. at 1285–86. 
 97. Id. at 1286. 
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effeminate mannerisms.”98 Razkane also failed to have “any boyfriends or other 
gay encounters in Morocco” and although he had engaged in homosexual 
conduct in the United States, “he [] had no boyfriends” and did not “appear to be 
committed to any particular homosexual relationship.”99 Finally the IJ stated 
Razkane “testified that he would probably be ‘involved’ in homosexual activity 
if he returned to Morocco.”100 Thus, Razkane’s lack of a Westernized 
stereotypical homosexual demeanor, coupled with his decision to live discretely 
in a persecutive environment because he was gay, prevented him from being 
found to be gay. 
Additionally, the IJ found that Razkane had not “shown that it [was] more 
likely than not that he would be engaged in homosexuality in Morocco or, even 
if he was, that it would be the type of overt homosexuality that would bring him 
to the attention of the authorities or of the society in general.”101 The IJ 
effectively relied not only on Razkane’s discretion, but also on Razkane’s failure 
to live up to the Western narrative of “being gay,” to determine he was not gay. 
Then, seemingly to add insult to injury, the IJ took this conception of gay and 
turned it around to the extent that he determined Razkane would not be subject to 
persecution if he returned to Morocco because no one would be able to tell he 
was gay as he would not engage in homosexual activity or, if he did, presumably 
no one would notice. Thus, to be a gender conforming gay man was not to be 
gay at all. The IJ’s decision was driven by the ability of the IJ to bend discretion 
in a manner that acted as both shield and sword: the decision used Razkane’s 
discretion to deny him his identity and to find that discretion protected his 
identity without ever acknowledging that identity. 
The Eighth Circuit wanted no part of this exercise. The circuit court found 
that the IJ’s factual determination about whether Razkane appeared sufficiently 
gay precluded meaningful review and that remand was required to get beyond 
the stereotypical assumptions used as evidence in this case.102 Unfortunately, the 
court did not engage in a broader discussion beyond the stereotyping that the IJ 
utilized. What was left unaddressed was whether or not the discretion exercised 
prior to Razkane’s application was an appropriate consideration at all and 
whether it was ever appropriate to hold discretion against an applicant coming 
from an ostensibly persecutive country. 
Similarly, the applicant in Shahinaj v. Gonzales103 was initially denied 
asylum because the IJ felt that “[the applicant] did not dress or speak like or 
                                                        
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. It bears considering whether this idea that you must pursue relationships or monogamy to 
be properly LGBT will go away anytime soon, particularly where the dominant dialogue in 
the United States has been about same sex marriage. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1288–89. 
 103. 481 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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exhibit the mannerisms of a homosexual.”104 Thus, the adjudicator found that 
even if Shahinaj were returned, he would not face persecution because he did not 
“look” gay.105 Again, discretion was used as both sword and shield, challenging 
Shahinaj’s identity and then using that identity against him in determining the 
level of persecution he would face. It was, and is, indicative of the Catch-22 
faced by asylum applicants. 
In Todorovic v. U.S. Attorney General, the IJ decided that although the 
applicant claimed to be singled out for persecution “‘because he [wa]s gay in his 
home country[,] . . . [t]he Court studied the demeanor of this individual very 
carefully throughout his testimony in Court today, and this gentleman does not 
appear to be overtly gay.’”106 The IJ instead found that it was not “readily 
apparent” that the applicant was gay “since he [bore] no effeminate traits or any 
other trait that would mark him as a homosexual.”107 
Based on this finding that Todorovic was not visibly gay, the IJ determined 
that he was not credible, that he was not a member of a PSG, and that he would 
not be subject to persecution if returned to Serbia because no one would be able 
to tell he was gay.108 Once again, establishing membership in a protected PSG 
was subject to the IJ’s Westernized notion of what it means to be gay. Indeed, 
that idea was so closely held that it caused the IJ to find that Todorovic was not 
credible despite the fact that “Todorovic never testified that he was ‘overtly gay’ 
or that this was the reason for his persecution; rather, the abuses to which he 
testified were the result of hostility by people who appeared to know he was gay 
for reasons other than his appearance or behavior.”109 
Again, Todorovic’s failure to identify as a gender conforming gay man led 
to the conclusion that not only was he “not gay,” but also that he was not 
credible simply because his identity did not deviate from the acceptable gender 
norm perceived by the adjudicator involved. While the circuit court remanded 
for a new determination based on actual evidence and expressed how troubling 
the IJ’s approach was, the court failed to clarify how such determinations should 
be made and how identity and conduct were to be properly considered in this 
context. 
In Hernandez-Montiel,110 a case where a male applicant identified as 
female but did not always present as female, the IJ found that the applicant’s 
female identity was not immutable or fundamental because he did not cross-
dress all the time.111 The Ninth Circuit clarified that the case was “about sexual 
identity, not fashion. Geovanni is not simply a transvestite . . . . Rather, 
                                                        
 104. Id. at 1029. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Todorovic v. U.S. Attorney General, 621 F.3d 1318, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 111. Id. at 1089. 
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Geovanni manifests his sexual orientation by adopting gendered traits 
characteristically associated with women.”112 Thus, the court was able to 
disentangle the IJ’s failure to distinguish between conduct and identity as it 
related to the applicant’s inclusion within that group. It dug deeper into the 
distinction between embodied and expressed identity and finding that he 
belonged to a recognizable PSG. 
While the United States has had difficulty separating Westernized notions 
of LGBT identity from asylum claims of applicants from the geopolitical South, 
the federal appellate courts have made it clear that an applicant cannot be 
required to exercise discretion upon return to his home country in order to avoid 
persecution. Debra Ankner and Sabi Ardalan have explained that the “U.S. 
jurisprudence recognizing forced renunciation and concealment of beliefs as 
persecutory harm is particularly robust.”113 This may be because the United 
States is more likely to recognize endogenous harms, those that are emotional or 
psychological, when considering what can constitute persecution, at least in the 
context of religious and political persecution.114 However, the practical 
implications of this robust protection as applied to renunciation and concealment 
for LGBT asylum claims may be negligible. This is because an LGBT applicant 
is less likely to be found to be part of the PSG based on discretion—as in 
Todorovic and Hernandez-Monteil—and the lack of visibility permits a finding 
that there is no well-founded fear of persecution upon his return. In other words, 
LGBT asylum applicants may be denied access to this robust protection where 
the asylum process relies so heavily on the same behaviors to exclude those 
applicants from the PSG in the first instance. 
C. Recent Changes in Process and What They Mean 
1. The Guidelines 
In 2012, the U.S. CIS issued Guidelines, and provided related training for 
initial asylum adjudicators, regarding the adjudication of LGBTI Refugee and 
Asylum Claims.115 Both the training module and Guidelines were the result of a 
                                                        
 112. Id. at 1096. 
 113. Deborah Anker & Sabi Ardalan, Escalating Persecution of Gays and Refugee Protection: 
Comment on Queer Cases Make Bad Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 529, 536–38 (2012); 
see also U.S. CIS Guidelines, supra note 15, at 21 (“Being compelled to abandon or conceal 
one’s sexual orientation or gender identity, where this is instigated or condoned by the state, 
may amount to persecution.”) (citing Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 114. U.S. CIS Guidelines, supra note 15, at 21 (citing Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 
1341, 1354 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[H]aving to practice religion underground to avoid 
punishment is itself a form of persecution.”)); see also Woldemichael v. Ashcroft, 448 F.3d 
1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 2006); Krotova v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In 
addition to the economic pressure and physical violence against Petitioner, her inability to 
practice her religion is significant.”); Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960–61 (7th Cir. 
2004); Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 719–20 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 115. U.S. CIS Guidelines, supra note 15.  
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collaborative effort between the U.S. CIS and non-governmental 
organizations.116 The purpose, as articulated by the U.S. CIS Guidelines, was to 
“1) increase awareness about issues sexual minorities face; 2) foster discussion 
about LGBTI issues; and, 3) provide consistent legal and interview guidance 
regarding these issues.”117 
The Guidelines are beneficial in that they distinguish between sexual 
identity, which is defined as internal and not necessarily visible, and gender 
expression, defined as “how a person expresse[s] one’s gender identity to others, 
often through behavior, clothing, hairstyles, voice or body characteristics.”118 
The Guidelines also clarify that social visibility does not require that an applicant 
“look gay or act gay.”119 They further highlight LGBT asylum applicants’ 
vulnerability to sexual violence.120 Finally, the guidance generally reflects the 
need to be sensitive to the applicant’s experience within their own culture and 
country, which is of critical importance when making these decisions because it 
focuses attention back on the persecutor instead of the persecuted.121 
Perhaps the best component of the Guidelines is solid guidance regarding 
conducting interviews with special attention paid to the delicate nature of LGBT 
asylum applications and the discomfort that both the adjudicator and the 
applicant may experience.122 This guidance includes a discussion of some of the 
more harmful Westernized notions of what it means to be LGBT and how they 
impact applicants who are not Westernized or may hold different conceptions of 
what it means to be LGBT. For example, the guidelines discuss the applicant’s 
general lack of familiarity with LGBT terminology, the applicant’s marital status 
or whether the applicant has children, and whether the applicant “looks” or 
“acts” gay.123 
The downside to the Guidelines is two-fold. First, they are not binding and 
can only go so far in addressing identity issues at initial adjudication. Second, it 
is somewhat disconcerting that discretion is not discussed more specifically. 
Instead, discretion concerns are part of the background in the sections that 
address the Westernized notions of LGBT, but the document itself still has a 
                                                        
 116. Id. at 12. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 13. It also clarifies that transgender is a gender identity, not a sexual orientation, 
allowing that like anyone else, a transgender person may have a heterosexual, bisexual or 
homosexual orientation. Id.  
 119. Id. at 16. The Guidelines explain that, for purposes of “social visibility,” the determination 
should be whether the society in question “distinguishes sexual minorities from other 
individuals in a meaningful way.” Id. at 17. 
 120. Id. at 21–22. 
 121. Id. at 23 (discussing the very real impact of being disowned by family, being unmarried, or 
even being forced to marry).  
 122. Id. at 27–28. For example, the Guidelines suggest that an adjudicator ask a transgender 
applicant at the beginning of the interview what gender pronoun the applicant feels more 
comfortable with and if there is a name preference. Id. at 28. I would suggest that this would 
be an appropriate question for any LGBTI applicant. They also suggest being mindful of 
terminology or language used because our language may not reflect theirs. Id. at 31. 
 123. Id. at 39–40. 
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distinct Western perspective (frequently mentioning the “coming out” process) 
and does not address the issue of discretion in identity determinations 
separately.124 Still, it is a laudable attempt to address the issues that have arisen 
in initial adjudications of LGBT asylum claims by reaching out to educate those 
that make the critical first decision and control matters such as credibility 
determinations. 
2. Refining Particular Social Group 
In addition to changing guidelines, the definition of PSG has shifted as 
well—a shift important in the larger context of LGBT asylum claims. The 
question involves whether the change in PSG will have a positive impact on 
future LGBT asylum claims, will work with the guideline changes, or will work 
against these guideline changes in a way that has yet to become apparent. 
While sexual orientation has been recognized as a PSG in the United States 
since 1994, this recognition has in some sense complicated the relationship 
between status, visibility, and acts with respect to inclusion in a PSG that is 
based predominantly on sexual orientation. Even though the term PSG has been 
subject to clarification and legal discourse, it is still considered ambiguous.125 In 
Matter of Acosta, the BIA first set forth a definition of PSG.126 The BIA 
interpreted “persecution on account of membership in a particular social group” 
to mean “persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a 
group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”127 The 
BIA further explained that: 
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or 
kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience 
such as former military leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of 
group characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. However, whatever the common 
characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the members of the 
group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it 
                                                        
 124. Id. The following passage is the only direct comment on discretion, and it is contained in the 
section related to the well-founded fear analysis:  
An applicant who was forced to conceal his or her sexual orientation or gender 
identity in the home country in order to avoid harm and did not suffer harm that 
rose to the level of persecution may still qualify for refugee or asylum status if 
he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution. In some cases, the experience 
of having to conceal sexual orientation or gender identity may itself result in 
suffering severe enough to constitute persecution. Some LGBTI applicants 
come to the United States for work or study and subsequently “come out” to 
themselves and to others. 
  Id. at 47–48. 
 125. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 126. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232–33 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 127. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1091 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233). 
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is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.128 
The term was further refined in 2006, through a series of BIA cases that 
added the concepts of “particularity” and “social visibility” to the definition.129 
Particularity requires that the PSG be “sufficiently distinct” and that it constitute 
a “discrete class of persons.”130 Social visibility requires that the “the shared 
characteristic of the [particular social] group should generally be recognizable by 
others in the community.”131 Thus, in order to constitute a PSG the group itself 
must “have particular and well-defined boundaries” and “possess a recognized 
level of social visibility.”132 
One problem that has caused confusion and disagreement amongst the 
federal courts with respect to the definition of PSG has been the meaning of the 
phrase “social visibility.”133 “In some cases, U.S. adjudicators have required that 
an applicant be literally visibly identifiable, an especially problematic 
requirement in cases involving sexual orientation where a finding of ‘visibility’ 
would force adjudicators to reach improper conclusions based on their own 
stereotypes.”134 As cases like Razkane, Todorovic, and Shahinaj highlight, a 
literal interpretation of social visibility not only allows adjudicators to look for 
the expressive “right kind” of LGBT identity but also renders emotional and 
psychological harms invisible in a way that is not in keeping with the United 
States definition of persecution. 
 The question then is whether the BIA’s recently announced refinement of 
the definition of PSG with respect to social visibility, in response to concerns 
raised by the federal courts, will have a positive impact on LGBT asylum 
adjudications.135 The BIA undertook the clarification of PSG because, 
“[c]ontrary to our intent, the term ‘social visibility’ has led some to believe that 
literal, that is, ‘ocular’ or ‘on-sight,’ visibility is always required for a particular 
social group to be cognizable under the Act.”136 To remedy this problem, the 
                                                        
 128. Id. at 1091–92. 
 129. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1115 (2007); 
Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73–76 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-
Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 
595–96 (B.I.A. 2008); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582–88 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 130. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584.  
 131. Id. at 586. 
 132. Id. at 582. 
 133. See Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 672–73 (6th Cir. 2013); Henriquez-Rivas v. 
Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 134. Escalating Persecution of Gays and Refugee Protection: Comment on Queer Cases Make 
Bad Law, supra note 113, at 551–52. 
 135. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 207 (B.I.A. 2014) (considering whether former Mara 18 
gang members in El Salvador who have renounced their gang membership constitute a PSG); 
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 227 (considering whether applicant who was a target 
of gangs for membership in Guatemala was part of a PSG). These cases were remanded by 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for precisely this purpose of clarifying the definition of 
PSG. 
 136. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 211 (citing Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of 
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BIA renamed “social visibility” as “social distinction” while reaffirming that 
such a requirement still comports with United States and international definitions 
of refugee.137 As such, in order to be socially distinct a PSG need not be “seen” 
by society, but it must instead be “perceived as a group” by society.138 Thus, 
“social distinction exists where the relevant society perceives, considers, or 
recognizes the group as a distinct social group.”139 In fact, in explaining that this 
had been the norm within BIA asylum decisions, the BIA specifically identified 
“homosexuals” in Toboso-Alfonso as an example of a PSG that was distinct, but 
not necessarily visible, and clearly considered a distinct social group in the 
applicant’s country of origin.140  
 While this may serve to further clarify the formulation of a PSG generally, 
the fact is that PSG is already fairly well-defined for LGBT asylum applicants. 
The real issue is whether in the membership determination the PSG requirement 
can now be used to protect individuals seeking membership within a group that 
has been subjected to an inappropriate “visibility” requirement. While there is a 
benefit in removing the word “visibility” from the definition of refugee, 
problems persist. The problem is that even the term “social distinction” carries 
with it identity markers that are imputed to individuals in a way that will 
continue to allow individual adjudicators too much latitude in determining 
whether an applicant should be given membership in a PSG. The initial 
adjudicator will still be looking for manifestations of distinction in the 
individual’s appearance and behavior instead of leaving the distinction 
determination at the macro level of determining the appropriate PSG. Thus, it 
seems that applicants will still be subject to Western essentialist notions of what 
it means to be gay or transgender, and subject to improper consideration of 
discretion.  
 For example, in Hernandez-Montiel both the IJ and the BIA found that the 
PSG consisted of gay Mexican men that dressed as women and then excluded 
                                                        
U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 606 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
 137. Id. at 212, 216 (“Our definition of ‘social visibility’ clarified the importance of ‘perception’ 
or ‘recognition’ in the concept of the particular social group. The term was never meant to be 
read literally, but our use of the word ‘visibility’ unintentionally promoted confusion. We 
now rename that requirement ‘social distinction’ to clarify that social visibility does not 
mean ‘ocular’ visibility―either of the group as a whole or of individuals within the 
group―any more than a person holding a protected religious or political belief must be 
‘ocularly’ visible to others in society.”). 
 138. Id. at 216 (“Our precedents have collectively focused on the extent to which the group is 
understood to exist as a recognized component of the society in question.”). 
 139. Id. at 217. 
 140. Id. (“[W]e held that homosexuals in Cuba constituted a cognizable social group in Matter of 
Toboso-Alfonso. The group had sufficient particularity because it was discrete and readily 
definable. The evidence in that case also established social distinction. The Cuban 
Government classified homosexuals as a group and criminalized homosexuality. It also 
maintained files on them and required them to register and periodically appear for a hearing 
and physical exam. The Union of Communist Youth held a protest against homosexuals. For 
these reasons, it was apparent that Cuban society perceived homosexuals as a distinct 
group.”). 
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the applicant because he did not always dress as a woman and was targeted in his 
home country because he dressed as a male prostitute, with the result that his 
identity did not match the PSG.141 The circuit court found the PSG was 
improperly drawn because it was not the act of dressing as a woman that was 
immutable, but that the members of the group had a female sexual identity that 
was clearly persecuted in Mexico.142 The distinction both the IJ and the BIA 
failed to recognize was that what made the applicant distinct was not his 
behavior, but how he identified himself. When that self-identification did not 
neatly fit within the IJ’s understanding of how a female-identified homosexual 
man might behave, the IJ declined to include the applicant in the PSG.  
 While the new definition of PSG may have helped with the proper 
recognition of the PSG itself, the reality is that the IJ in that case still would not 
have placed Hernandez-Montiel in that PSG because as a homosexual man he 
failed to consistently cross-dress or display appropriate effeminate behaviors that 
would have satisfied the IJ’s vision of how a Mexican homosexual who had a 
female sexual identity should behave. Placement within a PSG should not 
require a certain behavior to be constant as long as the identifying characteristics 
are present. That is no better than finding that he could escape persecution by 
choosing not to cross-dress. It also highlights once again how discretion can be 
inappropriately inserted into the inquiry where the applicant’s behavior in a 
persecutive environment is used against him. 
 
IV. PROCESSING LGBT ASYLUM CLAIMS IN AUSTRALIA 
Australia has recently experienced new issues with discretion that had 
failed to exist previously. While Australia had a problem with discretion where it 
impacted the finding of persecution, it now has a problem with discretion 
impacting identity determinations. Australia’s attempt to address discretion in 
one area of the adjudicative process appears to have created a new problem in a 
formerly less problematic step in the process. Reviewing how Australia got 
there, and how these new issues with discretion have arisen in the identity 
determination, is instructive in understanding the larger problems presented by 
the use of discretion in LGBT asylum determinations. 
A. Features of the Australian System 
A person claiming refugee status may seek a protection visa in Australia 
pursuant to section 36 of the Migration Act of 1958.143 Initial interviews are 
conducted by trained officers in Australia’s Department of Immigration and 
                                                        
 141. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 142. Id. at 1095–96. 
 143. Migration Act of 1958 § 36(1)–(2). 
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Border Protection,144 in a manner that mirrors the process in the United States. If 
the application is denied, applicants have a right of review before a Refugee 
Review Tribunal, or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.145 An unfavorable 
decision can be appealed on the basis of legal error to the Federal Magistrates 
Court.146 
B. Discretion, Persecution, and Identity in Australia 
Prior to 2002, Australian courts and tribunals had held that an applicant 
could be expected to act with discretion and actively participate in his or her own 
protection, if doing so would prevent persecution.147 Thus, discretion entered the 
decision-making calculus after an applicant had been identified as LGBT, had 
been acknowledged as a member of a PSG, and the country of origin had been 
found to have a persecutive environment. This all changed when the High Court 
of Australia handed down its decision in Appellant S395/2002 and S396/2002.148 
As framed by Justices McHugh and Kirby, the issues in Appellant S395/2002 
were whether it was appropriate to divide homosexual men into two PSGs 
(discrete and non-discrete), whether the need to act discretely to avoid serious 
harm constituted persecution, and whether the applicants might suffer harm if 
members of the Bangladeshi community discovered their homosexuality.149 
The Australian High Court rejected the idea that an applicant could be 
required to live discretely or with a level of discretion that can “reasonably be 
tolerated” in order to avoid persecution upon his return to his home country.150 
The Court cautioned about the danger in employing discretion in this manner 
and, much like the concern raised by some U.S. decisions, explained why 
permitting discretion to be part of the calculation is problematic: 
In cases where the applicant has modified his or her conduct, there is a 
natural tendency for the tribunal of fact to reason that, because the applicant 
                                                        
 144. Australian Human Rights Comm’n, Face the Facts: Some Questions and Answers About 
Indigenous People, Migrants and Refugees and Asylum Seekers (2012), 
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/race-discrimination/publications/2012-face-facts. 
 145. Immigration Direct, A Guide to the Process of Seeking Asylum in Australia, 
http://immigrationdirect.com.au/asylum-australia.jsp. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See, e.g., WABR v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 121 FCR 196, 
205 [27]; Applicant LSLS v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) FCA 
211 at [24]. “‘Discretion’ reasoning had appeared very widely in the refugee case law of both 
Australia and the United Kingdom” prior to the decisions in Appellant S395 although similar 
reasoning had been rejected in Canada and New Zealand. Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 
12, at 391. See also Catherine Dauvergne & Jenni Millbank, Before the High Court: 
Applicants S396/2002 and S395/2002, A Gay Refugee Couple from Bangladesh, 25 SYDNEY 
L. REV. 97, 98-99 (2003); Jenni Millbank, The Role of Rights in Asylum Claims on the Basis 
of Sexual Orientation, 4 HUM. RTS L. REV. 193, 200 (2004).  
 148. Appellant S395 (2003) 216 C.L.R. 473, 493, 503 (McHugh and Kirby, JJ and Gummow and 
Hayne, JJ, respectively), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fd9eca84.html.  
 149. Id. at 518. 
 150. Id.  
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has not been persecuted in the past, he or she will not be persecuted in the 
future. The fallacy underlying this approach is the assumption that the 
conduct of the applicant is uninfluenced by the conduct of the persecutor 
and that the relevant persecutory conduct is the harm that will be inflicted. 
In many—perhaps the majority of—cases, however, the applicant has acted 
in the way that he or she did only because of the threat of harm. In such 
cases, the well-founded fear of persecution held by the applicant is the fear 
that, unless that person acts to avoid the harmful conduct, he or she will 
suffer harm. It is the threat of serious harm with its menacing implications 
that constitutes the persecutory conduct.151 
The Court made it clear that a tribunal could not impose any expectation of 
discretion on an applicant and that “if applicants were to feel obliged to remain 
discreet for fear of being persecuted then the threat of serious harm would 
constitute persecutory conduct in itself.”152 What the Australian High Court 
seemed to leave open, and what at least one British court picked up on, was the 
possibility that if an asylum applicant chose to live discretely for reasons other 
than a fear of persecution, then an asylum adjudicator could find that the 
applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution because his secretive 
behavior was not tied to a fear of persecution such that asylum protection was 
necessary. 
The decision in HJ and HT in the United Kingdom, which was based on 
the Australian High Court’s decision in Appellant S395, demonstrates the 
pernicious nature of discretion and its ability to reemerge in asylum discourse in 
yet another guise. As a Commonwealth decision, and yet another decision from a 
Western receiving nation, it reinforces the idea that discretion is not a uniquely 
American problem and illustrates how an Australian court’s decision can impact 
asylum process in other countries with respect to discretion.  In HJ and HT the 
Supreme Court, after reviewing Appellant S395 in depth, articulated a new test 
for well-founded fear of persecution in LGBT asylum cases in the United 
Kingdom that dispensed with the reasonably tolerable test but imposed a new 
test that hinged a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution on an applicant’s 
behavior and subjective fear of persecution.153 
The court found that if the applicant would act discretely for reasons other 
than a well-founded fear of persecution, then it was okay to send them home, 
even where they might be subject to the death penalty for homosexual activity, 
because the applicant did not fear persecution because of the applicant’s sexual 
orientation.154 In essence, the court split entitlement to asylum between those 
                                                        
 151. Id. at 490. 
 152. RRT Case No. 1207970, (2012) RRTA 757, Austl.: Refugee Review Tribunal (Sept. 3, 
2012) (citing Appellant S395/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
(2003) 216 C.L.R. 473), http://www.refworld.org/docid/507d49ae2.html. 
 153. HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), (2010) UKSC 31, 8–29 (Lord 
Hope), 38 (Lord Rodger), (2011) 1 A.C. 596, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c3456752.html. 
 154. Id. 
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who would live openly as homosexuals or would choose not to due to the threat 
of persecution, and those who would choose to act discretely simply because it 
was in their nature, or for cultural or religious reasons. Lord Hope explained the 
test thusly: 
[I]f it is found that the applicant will in fact conceal aspects of his sexual 
orientation if returned, [then the next step] is to consider why he will do so. 
If this will simply be in response to social pressures or for cultural or 
religious reasons of his own choosing and not because of a fear of 
persecution, his claim for asylum must be rejected. But if the reason why he 
will resort to concealment is that he genuinely fears that otherwise he will 
be persecuted, it will be necessary to consider whether that fear is well 
founded.155 
This seems to beg an obvious question: by filing an asylum application in 
the first place, hasn’t an applicant fulfilled the subjective component of the test? 
If I ask to stay in a receiving country because I fear persecution in my country of 
origin, regardless of why I behave the way I do, shouldn’t that be enough? 
In the years following Appellant S395/2002, the initial determination of 
identity and membership in a PSG has been more frequently challenged in 
Australia, which seems to track the experience in the United States.156 Thus, 
there has been a clear shift from using discretion in the determination of an 
applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution to using not only discretion but also 
a Westernized view of LGBT identity, to find that applicants are not LGBT and 
are not entitled to membership in a PSG in the first place.157 
 
V. DISCRETION, IDENTITY, AND SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE 
LGBT asylum applicants face an uphill battle in seeking protection because 
their sexual orientation is invisible and their “otherness”—both individually and 
politically—makes them vulnerable. Fundamentally, sexual orientation is 
seemingly perceived as a behavior, or even a belief, and not as an identity. 
Equally as damaging, the conception of what constitutes LGBT sexual 
orientation is tainted by a Western essentialist vision of what it means to be 
LGBT or to have a sexual orientation that is not heteronormative. These issues 
persist within the first-level decision making process in both the United States 
and Australia for two reasons: first, those persons who initially adjudicate claims 
are most likely to hold these essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation and 
identity; second, those beliefs are more likely to manifest in fact-finding 
proceedings such as the type conducted by initial adjudicators.158 Another 
                                                        
 155. Id. at 17 (¶ 35(d)). 
 156. Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 12, at 392–93. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Deborah A. Morgan, Not Gay Enough for the Government: Racial and Sexual 
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reason, slightly more amorphous, is the political nature of the asylum process 
and its link to the broader immigration concerns and the evolving nature of the 
LGBT community in receiving countries such as the United States and 
Australia.159 
Both the United States and Australia seem to be under constant political 
pressure with respect to immigration because their geographic locations make 
them accessible and desirable for migrants from the geopolitical South. In the 
United States, there is no more obvious an example than the migration of 
undocumented minors from Central America who are fleeing gangs and violence 
in their native countries.160 Additionally, the invisible population of 
undocumented persons residing in the United States is a constant target of 
political aggression by and between political ideologues and the general 
population, who tend to scapegoat undocumented immigrant and asylum seekers 
for every conceivable harm suffered in society.161 The result is a society that has 
                                                        
Stereotypes in Sexual Orientation Asylum Cases, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 135, 137 (2006) 
(arguing that “the facially neutral asylum process conceals the fact that immigration officials 
and judges make decisions based on racialized sexual stereotypes and culturally specific 
notions of homosexuality”); Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 12, at 392–93; see also Gay 
Asylum Seekers Face ‘Humiliation’, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/08/gay-asylum-seekers-humiliation-home-
office (noting the invasive and lurid questions Home Office officials asked of gay asylum 
seekers); Sally Hayden, The UK Wants to Deport a Ugandan Woman Who Fled Her Country 
After an Exorcism, VICE NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/the-uk-wants-
to-deport-a-ugandan-woman-who-fled-her-country-after-an-exorcism (noting Home Office 
officials’ doubts about an asylum-seeker’s sexuality). 
 159. In Australia and in the United States, immigration seems to be a persistent salient issue. In 
the United States, Central Americans are coming across the border to avoid crime and gang 
violence, and Haitians and Cubans are coming to seek economic relief. In Australia, the same 
is true of Pacific Rim countries. See Editorial, Australia’s Refugee Problem, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/opinion/australias-refugee- 
problem.html; Glenda Kwek, Processing Asylum Seekers: How It Works, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.smh.com.au/national/processing-asylum-seekers-how-
it-works-2011001-1jnj6.html. Also, Australia caps the number of refugee and asylum 
applicants it will accept under its Humanitarian Program. Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
Guide, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N (Aug. 14, 2015), 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/asylum-seekers-and-refugees-guide. For 2013–14 that 
number was 13,750. Id. The Australian government also has a third country processing 
system in place for refugees who arrive in Australia by boat or without a valid visa, and an 
enhanced screening process for people who arrive by boat from Sri Lanka. Id. More recently, 
Europe and most of the political north have begun to feel similar pressures as receiving 
countries as the Syrian refugee crisis hit a new level in 2015, helping to create a perfect 
storm of refugee migration crises. See generally Patrick Boehler & Sergio Pecaha, The 
Global Refugee Crisis, Region by Region, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-
mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.html. 
 160. See Julia Preston, As U.S. Speeds the Path to Deportation, Distress Fills New Family 
Detention Centers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/us/seeking-to-stop-migrants-from-risking-trip-us-
speeds-the-path-to-deportation-for-families.html; Julia Preston, Hoping for Asylum, Migrants 
Strain U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/us/poverty-and-violence-push-new-wave-of-migrants-
toward-us.html?_r=0. 
 161. See, e.g., Jamie Longazel & Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Exploiting Borders: The Political 
KOLINSKY_FINAL WORD DOC 7.23.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/23/2016  3:16 PM 
THE SHIBBOLETH OF DISCRETION 235 
significant anti-immigration sentiment.162 In Australia, a similar pattern has 
emerged: there has been more prominent anti-immigration sentiment against 
those fleeing economic and political strife in Southeast Asia.163 
The emerging cultural acceptance of LGBT lives in the United States 
highlights a slightly different pressure point. Culturally, the United States has 
been consumed, to some extent, with the push to recognize gay marriage in this 
country. Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court and other federal 
courts continue to recognize and expand the rights of LGBT persons in this 
country.164 However, in making LGBT relationships more normative, the courts 
seem to have crafted an LGBT identity that is static and unchanging. Where a 
problem in the past may have been an unfamiliarity with LGBT lifestyle, the 
concern looking forward is whether this known version of the LGBT experience 
will become the normative narrative for initial adjudicators. 
A. Linking Discretion and Identity: A Symbiotic Relationship of 
Visibility and Vulnerability 
The evolution of case law in the United States, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom demonstrates the inextricable link between identity and discretion. 
This link exists in part because sexual orientation is perceived to exist as a set of 
behaviors rather than as an identity that is both embodied and expressed. The 
reason we fail to express our identity openly can be based on a complex mix of 
personal, familial, social, cultural, and religious reasons.165 In most instances, 
those choices are based on how we believe we will be perceived by society at 
large. In the context of an asylum applicant, while some of the individual’s 
choices of expression may not be based on a “well-founded fear of persecution,” 
as contemplated by the 1951 Convention, they may be driven by the context 
within which those decisions are made, rather than by the applicant’s identity. 
For example, a gay man in the United States may choose not to discuss his 
sexual identity at work or with his family for his own personal reasons. In that 
context, the issue is not whether such choices may be based on fear of 
persecution in the broader sense, because they likely are. Rather, the question is 
either whether the threat of persecution rises to a level that cannot be reasonably 
                                                        
Economy of Local Backlash Against Undocumented Immigrants, 30 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O 
L. REV. 43 (2011) (considering the political and economic implications of immigrant labor 
juxtaposed against the anti-immigrant sentiment that is so prevalent along the U.S./Mexican 
border); Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, When Others Get Too Close: Immigrants, 
Class, and the Health Care Debate, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283 (2010) (discussing 
anti-immigration issues and healthcare reform).  
 162. Id. 
 163. See sources and accompanying text, supra note 159. 
 164. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015); U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___ (2013); 
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 165. See generally Finding the Fundamental, supra note 71; Swetha Sridharan, The Difficulties of 
U.S. Asylum Claims Based on Sexual Orientation, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Oct. 29, 2008), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/difficulties-us-asylum-claims-based-sexual-
orientation. 
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tolerated or whether there is a threat of harm against which the State fails to 
protect. In the United States, LGBT citizens still face violence, threats of harm, 
and discrimination.166 Unlike many countries, the United States has laws against 
discrimination in housing, services, and employment, which should protect 
against manifestations of homophobia and transphobia.167 These laws are 
arguably enforced although the public conservative backlash has reached new 
heights in the wake of Obergefell.168 But when set in an environment that is 
socially homophobic and religiously conservative—or, even worse, where there 
is state-sponsored homophobia—any behavior that may be deemed voluntary 
discretion should be viewed instead as driven by persecution rather than 
attempting to dissect the underlying subjective forces driving such behavior.169 
For me, the maddening part of any type of metric to measure discretion is that 
while there are more open societies and more closed societies in terms of 
acceptance of LGBT citizens, the variations within even open societies render 
                                                        
 166. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, Non-Discrimination Laws, 
http://www.transequality.org/issues/non-discrimination-laws; NAT’L COALITION OF ANTI-
VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, Media Alert, 
http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/2016.2.23_ncavp_ma_mayayoung.pdf; NAT’L 
COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, Media Alert, 
http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/Reports/MEDIARELEASE_2014_NCAVP_HVREP
ORT.pdf; CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Gay and Transgender People Face High Rates of 
Workplace Discrimination and Harassment, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/06/02/9872/gay-and-transgender-
people-face-high-rates-of-workplace-discrimination-and-harassment/; THE WILLIAMS 
INSTITUTE, Employment Discrimination Against LGBT Workers, 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/headlines/research-on-lgbt-workplace-protections/. 
 167. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352; Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 
3601.  
 168. This does not suggest the United States is without problems, but rather that those problems 
experienced by LGBT citizens likely do not rise to the level of persecution contemplated by 
the 1951 Convention, with the exception of transgender persons. See National Report on 
Hate Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and HIV-Affected 
Communities Released Today (May 29, 2014), http://equalitymi.org/media-center/media-
releases/national-report-hate-violence-against-lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender-0; James 
Nichols, Transgender Murders 50 Percent Higher Than Gays, Lesbians in July, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (AUG. 27, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/27/trans-
murder-rates_n_3824273.html. 
 169. See Queer Cases, supra note 23, at 351–52. Hathaway and Pobjoy note that the way to move 
beyond the cast of reasonable tolerability and allow endogenous harm to be properly 
recognized as follows: 
[D]rawing on the established view of the risk of being persecuted as comprised 
of the sustained or systemic failure of state protection in relation to one of the 
core entitlements that has been recognized by the international community . . . 
there are at least two ways in which application of this accepted framework 
could have yielded the substantive result embraced by the courts[.] . . . The first 
approach is to define the harm as the modification of behavior itself, amounting 
to the denial of the right to a private life. The second approach is to define the 
harm as the psychological harm occasioned by the modification of behavior. In 
both cases, the requirement that there be a failure of state protection will be 
readily established by the failure to the state to provide a meaningful response to 
the precipitating cause of the serious harm. 
  See id. 
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any objective measure of context difficult. However, by failing to provide any 
sort of metric to measure the context within which discretion is potentially 
exercised, the invisibility of LGBT asylum applicants acts as a barrier to 
protecting their vulnerability.170 
The failure to fully realize the complexity of discretion has manifested 
itself in an interesting way. In the United States, lower-level adjudicatory 
decisions have found that an applicant is not LGBT, and thus not a member of a 
PSG, because the applicant does not behave or look a certain way.171 If an 
applicant is discrete or gender-conforming in behavior, manner, or appearance, 
then the application may fail despite the fact that applicant identifies as 
LGBT.172 Thus, even though discretion as such is not properly considered in 
terms of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution, it has found its way into 
the asylum process in terms of identifying an applicant as a member of an LGBT 
PSG. 
In Australia, this far more subtle application of discretion has surfaced in 
the determination of identity after discretion related to the well-founded fear of 
persecution component of the test was struck down by the High Court in 
Appellant S395/2002.173 When discretion was removed from one component, it 
simply reemerged as a challenge to identity similar to decisions in the United 
States.174 In fact, this is particularly striking because even the Bangladeshi 
couple seeking asylum in Appellant S395/2002 was denied asylum by the 
Tribunal on remand because it was found that they were not gay after all.175 
B. What’s the Next Step in Protecting LGBT Applicants from the 
Improper Use of Discretion? 
As discretion has migrated from a persecution discourse to an identity 
discourse, it has gained power from an unlikely ally, a Western narrative of what 
it means to be LGBT.176 This is a problem because, as the UNHCR has reported, 
                                                        
 170. See generally Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 (2005) INLR 68 at [113-14] (N.Z.) (finding that 
the defensive act of “self-denial” to avoid death or bodily harm satisfied the requirement of 
well-found fear of persecution). 
 171. See Summary Report, Informal Meeting of Experts on Refugee Claims relating to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at 10 
(Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fa910f92.html (“Participants recalled the 
shift from ‘discretion’ to disbelief in refusal decisions and that first instance decisions more 
and more question whether a person is LGBTI as claimed.”).  
 172. See, e.g., Todorovic, 621 F.3d at 1326–27. In contrast to the lower level adjudicatory 
decisions in these cases, Mr. Castro was fortunate enough to receive a positive decision in his 
asylum claim. Dan Bilefsky, Gays Seeking Asylum in U.S. Encounter a New Hurdle, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/nyregion/29asylum.html. So 
perhaps his attorney’s advice to engage in overstated understatement within the traditional 
Western gay narrative was, in fact, the best course of action.  
 173. See Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 12, at 392. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 392–93. 
 176. Id. (finding an alarming number of cases where applicants were cross-examined using highly 
stereotypical and Westernized notions of gayness as a template and denying claims when the 
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“[c]redibility assessments are influenced by stereotypical assumptions of the way 
in which LGBTI applicants should look or behave. Also, adjudicators often do 
not have the necessary training.”177 Eradicating discretion as a determiner of 
identity needs to be introduced into initial proceedings so that Westernized 
LGBT narratives are neutralized and a space is opened for LGBT experiences 
from both the political North and South. Allowing the federal courts in both 
Australia and the United States to act as gatekeepers in this regard will not work 
since, by the time cases arrive on appeal, the damage is done and review of fact-
finding and credibility determinations is often limited. 
The United States’ CIS guidelines are a critical step in addressing both 
conscious and unconscious biases in the adjudicatory process. However, 
changing attitudes about LGBT identity is complicated, and the fact-finding 
nature of initial determinations may make correcting continuing bias difficult. 
Unfortunately, underlying political pressures—such as a desire to weed out false 
claims—in the asylum process will virtually always impact an identity 
determination that is best left to the applicant alone, so as to not exclude valid 
claims in an attempt to block false claims.178 Even social progress can be 
problematic, creating a narrative for the masses that cannot adapt beyond a 
                                                        
applicant failed to meet the stereotype). 
 177. Summary Report, supra note 171, at 10–11. The UNHCR has discussed using the 
“Difference-Stigma-Shame-Harm” model as an “identity checklist” to assist asylum 
adjudicators in making decisions that respect the applicant’s individual experience within a 
broader normative framework. Id. As defined in the UNHCR’s Summary Report: 
Difference refers to self-recognition or identification by others of when one is 
not living a heterosexual narrative, i.e. not conforming to how straight people 
are expected to live their lives, e.g. a man “trapped in a woman’s body” or a 
woman without a male partner. Stigma relates to a recognition that close family 
members, friends or the “majority” disapprove of the applicant’s conduct and/or 
identity. It also involves a recognition of state/cultural/religious mores/laws 
which are directed towards LGBTI persons. Shame is another aspect, associated 
with stigma and isolation through the impact of being the “other” rather than the 
“same.” Harm relates to the specific forms of persecution that may be 
perpetrated upon LGBTI persons, including laws criminalizing same-sex 
conduct and the impact of these laws on the applicant as well as harm 
perpetrated by non-state actors such as mob violence and violence/killings in the 
name of “honor.” 
  Id. 
 178. The United States has always had concerns about immigration fraud, particularly fraudulent 
asylum claims. See Sam Dolnick, Immigrants May Be Fed False Stories to Bolster Asylum 
Claims, N.Y TIMES (July 11, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/nyregion/immigrants-may-be-fed-false-stories-to-
bolster-asylum-pleas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Kirk Semple et al., Asylum Fraud in 
Chinatown: An Industry of Lies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/nyregion/asylum-fraud-in-chinatown-industry-of-
lies.html; Asylum Fraud: Abusing America’s Compassion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration and Border Security, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (House Judiciary Committee Takes 
Testimony on Asylum System Abuses); Stephen Dinan, Audit Finds Asylum System Rife with 
Fraud: Approval Laws Broken with Surge of Immigrants, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2014), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/5/audit-finds-asylum-system-rife-with-
fraud/?pagesall. 
KOLINSKY_FINAL WORD DOC 7.23.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/23/2016  3:16 PM 
THE SHIBBOLETH OF DISCRETION 239 
Western view of what it means to be LGBT.179 
As Australia’s experience has demonstrated, discretion is a pernicious 
weed that will find a place to grow wherever there is a perceived weakness in the 
process. In order to move beyond the limitations that education may have in 
terms of resolving the improper use of discretion, it may be necessary to flip the 
script on discretion instead. Receiving countries could create a presumption that 
engaging in discretionary or covert behavior of any kind is positive evidence of 
LGBT persecution when the discretionary behavior is situated in a state with 
persecutive conditions. For example, in a socially, religiously conservative 
society that engages in state-sponsored homophobia via laws against 
homosexuality, a person who identifies as LGBT or is perceived to be LGBT 
may be physically harmed or killed.180 Thus, if an applicant has not conducted 
himself or herself openly, or even not at all, that “discretion” should reflect that 
the person has a well-founded fear of persecution and has behaved appropriately 
for an LGBT person in that country regardless of whether they satisfy a specific 
LGBT narrative. The strength of presumption of LGBT identity and persecution 
could increase in relation to the intensity of the persecutive environment.181 In 
other words, context is everything and the lens should be turned back on the 
persecutor in making these decisions. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Crafting a process that captures the different ways in which one can 
                                                        
 179. For example, as same sex couples continue to move forward in securing marriage rights, 
their assimilation into the traditional Western family narrative may hurt the stories of those 
who are neither Western nor seeking marital rights, but rather seeking protection from 
persecution. So while cases like Windsor and Baskin have been a boon to LGBT rights in the 
United States, they may actually act as a hindrance to those seeking asylum here to the extent 
they further solidify the Western LGBT experience.  
 180. Interestingly, even within a country that a Western receiving country might perceive as 
persecutive, there is still further nuance. For example, in Iran, while it may be difficult to be 
LGB, transgender citizens may not suffer in the same way because sex change operations 
and shifting gender is more acceptable. Lorah Moftah, Iran Transgender Law: Islamic 
Republic Advances Bill to Protect Transsexuals Amid Crackdown on Gay Rights, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES (May 27, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-transgender-law-islamic-republic-
advances-bill-protect-transsexuals-amid-1940978. And, in the United States, while being 
LGB may be better (i.e., it may be easier for most LGB folks to live openly than trans folks), 
and not subject to state-sponsored homophobia, the transgender population is subject to 
significant violence and suffers from high levels of depression and suicide. See generally 
NAT’L COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, 
TRANSGENDER, QUEER, AND HIV-AFFECTED HATE VIOLENCE IN 2013 (2014), 
http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/Reports/2014_HV_Report-Final.pdf; Harvard School 
of Public Health, Transgender Youth at Risk for Depression, Suicide, 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/hsph-in-the-news/transgender-youth-at-risk-for-
depression-suicide/. 
 181. This, of course, would require much better Country of Origin reports and reliance on reports 
from non-governmental organizations. But, it might be the next step beyond simply offering 
guidance on what questions to ask and may work against the bias that is unfortunately 
inherent in these types of claims. 
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embody their sexual orientation, while existing in a presumably persecutive 
environment, is critical to meaningful determination of LGBT asylum claims. 
Lord Walker observed in HJ and HT that: “neither the most courageous nor the 
most timorous forfeit protection as asylum seekers if, in their different ways, 
they satisfy the test of a well-founded fear of persecution because of their 
sexuality.”182 As Jenni Millbank explains, a new process requires 
[a] deep-seated, nuanced and context-sensitive equality analysis . . . to 
transform judicial understandings of minority sexual identities that go 
beyond (very) private gay sex from being understood as “flaunting,” 
“provoking,” “parading” or “publically proclaiming” . . . into what is really 
being claimed: the right to live an ordinary everyday normal . . . life openly 
as an LGBT person.183 
At the end of the day, the entire process can be broken down into a 
deceivingly simple inquiry: if you live in a country where you cannot 
affirmatively answer the seemingly simple question, “Are you gay?”184 without 
facing persecution, the threat of significant harm, or marginalization, and if there 
is also a lack of meaningful state protection because of your answer, then you 
should be able to maintain an asylum claim.185 The mere fact that you could lie 
in response to the question should be completely irrelevant.186 Similarly, the 
mere fact that you choose not to answer the question because you are a private 
person should be completely irrelevant as well. Instead, if affirmance of your 
identity as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or queer would result in harm, then 
your inability to affirm your status is, in fact, just as harmful. 
 
                                                        
 182. HJ (Iran) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (HJ and HT), (2010) UKSC 31, (2011) 1 A.C. 
596, at 45, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c3456752.html. 
 183. Millbank, supra note 12, at 33. 
 184. Or: “Are you bisexual?”; “Are you lesbian?”; “Are you queer?”; “Are you transgendered?”; 
“Are you gender fluid?” 
 185. Persecution, or the threat of persecution, as defined by the 1951 Convention. See 1951 
Convention, supra note 4. I am not talking about not being able to see a Kylie Minogue 
concert. This question does not presume that this would be a safe question to answer in some 
parts of the United States, Australia, or the United Kingdom, rather it seeks to make a point 
about the social environment within which an LGBT applicant is situated generally. If the 
response is that I would answer this question in an urban area, and not a rural one within the 
same country, then that should be taken into account, but it highlights once again the 
complexity of applying any rules that implicate an applicant’s behavior.  
 186. Australia and the United States seem to agree on this point. 
